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CAN THE FIRST AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS CO-
EXIST IN A MEDIA SATURATED SOCIETY?
Media plays such an important role in society today that in a
highly publicized case, it is difficult to find a prospective juror who
has never heard of the defendant on trial.1 The shocking nature of
certain crimes, coupled with the accused's fame, play on society's
emotions.2 Sensationalized accounts by the press cause society to pre-
form opinions as to the guilt of the defendant. 3 Pretrial publicity can
be so excessive as' to violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment 4 right to
a fair trial.5 Such intensive media coverage limits a defendant's
fundamental right to an impartial jury and thus, a fair trial.6 First
Amendment 7 rights of the press often conflict with the Sixth and
Fourteenth 8 Amendment rights of the defendant. 9  In many cases,
1 See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Court System Panel: The Media, Attorneys, and
Fair Criminal Trials, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1995) (stating that- due to the
inventions of increasingly new technology, information is disseminated as soon as it
becomes available).2 See PETmE. KANE, MURDER, COURTS, AND THE PRESS xi (1992) (indicating
that the events surrounding a murder fascinate the public).
3See Howard, supra note 1, at 61 (explaining that the ability of the media to
influence the jurors before they enter a courtroom impacts the fairness and impartiality of
the trial).
4 The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
5 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (stating that "the trial
judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity
which saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in the courtroom...
.11).
6 Id. at 359 (stating that the court should have exerted effort to control gossip
surrounding the trial which was inaccurate and led to unfounded rumors and confusion).
7 The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 The Fourteenth Amendment states:
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however, the unfettered freedom of the press overpowers the criminal
defendant's ability to have a fair trial. 10
Set forth below in Part I is the history of how the courts and
the American Bar Association have dealt with pretrial publicity in
setting the standard for news control over cases." Part I discusses
how the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Earl Warren (hereinafter
"Warren Court"), suggested guidelines for determining whether the
defendant received a fair trial in high profile criminal cases. Part HI
shows how the courts have successfully implemented these standards
in highly publicized trials. Part IV focuses on the questioning of
jurors during voir dire. Part V covers how the expansive role of the
press has made it hard to place limitations on the amount of
information that is exposed. While murder trials continue to hold the
public's fascination, the expansive power of the press in covering
cases coupled with the many inaccuracies of the stories make it hard
to ensure a fair trial. 12  Part VI suggests measures that should be
implemented in order to uphold the Sixth Amendment.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.s. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
9 KANE, supra note 2 (stating the tension in the United States between the
First Amendment right of free press and a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a fair trial).
'
0See Robert Hardaway, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Cases of National
Notoriety. Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U.L. REv. 39, 41
(1996) (stating "the press' enhanced participation in the criminal trial process has resulted
in an increased number of appeals based on claims of unfair trials due to media-created
juror bias.").
"J. EDWARD GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME 31 (1983) (summarizing the news
control standards as established by the courts and the ABA).
12 KENNETH S. DEVOL, MASS MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT: THE LEGACY
OF THE WARREN YEARS 371 (4th ed. 1989). The courts have accorded extraordinary
protection to the press by expansively interpreting the First Amendment. Id.
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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. English History
After the American Revolution, the abuses of the English
courts in administering trials were a primary concern in establishing
the new American government. 13 Trials conducted in England were
closed to the public and the decisions were usually not announced. 14
As recently as 1967, the British Criminal Justice Act of 1967 was
enacted, closing preliminary hearings to the public. 5  The Act
provided that pretrial proceedings be on the basis of written rather
than oral evidence.16  Anything more than the simple facts of the
crime or the arrest were forbidden to be reported by the news media. ' 7
Only information presented in court may be reported while covering a
trial.'8
B. American History
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution was
written to protect against the abuses of the English system.'9 The
Sixth Amendment ensures a defendant's right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury.20  In guaranteeing a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right, courts are concerned with prejudicial pretrial
publicity. 2' As far back as 1807, with the treason trial of Aaron Burr,
13 KANE, supra note 2, at I (documenting how the British government
violated the fundamental rights of Englishmen claimed by the colonists).14 KANE, supra note 2, at 3.
15 GERALD, supra note 11, at 32-33 (providing that pre-trial proceedings be
based on writings rather than oral evidence).
16 GERALD, supra note 11, at 32 (indicating that the publication of such
evidence was unlawful).
17 KANE, supra note 2, at 5 (explaining certain provisions of the British
Criminal Justice Act of 1967).
18 KANE, supra note 2, at 5.
19 KANE, supra note 2, at 3 (stating it was a response to the injustice of the
English system and listed specific requirements for a fair trial).20 U.S CONST. amend. VI.
21 GERALD, supra note 11, at 3 (indicating that "in a case of a crime that
attracts a great deal of public attention it may be difficult... to find an impartial jury.").
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the courts have been struggling with this issue.22 The trial of former
Vice President Aaron Burr, who was accused of trying to make war in
the Louisiana Territory against the United States, was covered
extensively by the press.23 The alleged crime of treason coupled with
the fact that he killed American hero Alexander Hamilton in a duel
aroused public curiosity. 24 Burr felt that he had no hope of obtaining
a jury that had not read the published charges against him. 25  Chief
Justice John Marshall ruled that, "in a capital case, the court ought to
obtain jurors with 'perfect freedom from previous impression,' but if
that were impossible, the duty of the court was to obtain as large a
portion of impartiality as possible." 26 The Chief Justice also stated,
I have always conceived, and still conceive, an
impartial jury as required by the common law, and as
secured by the Constitution, must be composed of
men, who will fairly hear the testimony which may be
offered to them, and bring in their verdict, according
to that testimony, and according to the law arising on
it. This is not to be expected, certainly the law does
not expect it, where jurors, before they hear the
testimony, have deliberately formed and delivered an
opinion, that the person whom they are to try, is guilty
or innocent of the charges alleged against him.
27
Burr was acquitted of treason.28 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
continues to serve as a guide for dealing with extensive media
coverage of a criminal case.29
22 GERALD, supra note 11, at 70 (documenting the history of the court's
concern with prejudicial pre-trial publicity).
23 GERALD, supra note 11, at 70 (citing the printing and circulation of
information in the Aaron Burr case as an historic example of prejudicial pre-trail
publicity).
24 GERALD, supra note 11, at 70.
25 GERALD, supra note 11, at 70.
26 GERALD, supra note 11, at 71.
27 GERALD, supra note 11, at 71.
28 GERALD, supra note 11, at 70 (stating the fact he was a lawyer and was
supported by experienced counsel helped him secure an acquittal).
29 GERALD, supra note 11, at 72.
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More recently, at the American Bar Association convention of
1966, the committee established standards in order to control the
media.30  The committee established that once a suspect is identified
or taken into custody, the lawyers, public officials and law
enforcement employees are restricted as to what information can be
released.3' For example, past criminal records and any alleged
confessions are among the prohibitions.3 2 Information concerning the
arrest and descriptions of the physical evidence are a part of the
information that is allowed to be released.33 The standards even allow
for closed hearings. 34  Moreover, "pretrial hearings of several kinds
can be moved to the judge's chambers, thus excluding the public. ' ' 35
Also, evidence which is privately submitted or rendered inadmissible
may not be released to the media.36  If any of this information is
reported in the news during the trial and reaches the jury, it may be
grounds for a motion for mistrial. Therefore, the committee's
mission is to ensure that the news media is restricted to reporting only
information that is in the court record.38
30 GERALD, supra note 11, at 31 (mandating that the past criminal or arrest
records of the accused must not be released).
31 GERALD, supra note 11, at 31.
32 Id. Before an arrest, and while the search for suspects is under way, the
release of news is not greatly impeded unless the pursuing officers identify their quarry in
terms that would impute guilt and create fear and prejudice among the people. But once a
specific person is identified in a warrant or is arrested, the lawyer, the public official, and
the law enforcement employees are told not to release: 1) past criminal or arrest records
of the accused; 2) any purported confession or statement or to report that the suspect
declined to give information; 3) any news of examinations or tests taken or refused; 4)
any probability of a plea of guilty to the charge or to a lesser charge; or 5) any opinion as
to guilt or innocence, as to the merits of the case or of the evidence. Id.
33 GERALD, supra note 11, at 32 (stating "information which can be freely
released includes the following: 1) the fact and circumstances of the arrest; 2) resistance,
pursuit, and use of weapons; 3) the identity of investigation and arresting officer(s) and
the length of the search; 4) a description of the physical evidence taken, the charges filed,
and the information about any stage in the investigation, including a denial of guilt by the
persons held.").
34 GERALD, supra note 11, at 32 (explaining that "the ABA standard assumes
that the constitution permits a defendant to waive a public hearing in favor of a closed
session in the judge's chambers or elsewhere outside the view of the public.").
35 GERALD, supra note 11, at 33; ABA standard, §8-3.2.
36 GERALD, supra note 11, at 33.
31 GERALD, supra note 11, at 33.
38 GERALD, supra note 11, at 33.
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These standards were adopted in 1968 in order to deal with
news proliferation and the problem of jury bias. 9 The ABA later
asked the courts to implement the standards because "the ethical rules
of bar associations are part of the private sector, but are meaningless
without sanctions from legislation or rules drawn by the courts.,
4 0
The committee's position was met with media opposition. However,
the Chairman reassured the news media by rejecting charges that the
rules gagged the press, and looked upon the First and Sixth
Amendments as coequal, not incompatible.4 1
Many judges began to seek "alternative solutions" before
closing their courts.42 The members of the ABA Legal Advisory
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press began to recommend changes
to the 1968 standard. 3 In 1977, the ABA Standards were revised.
The ABA standards now provide that "the presumption now is
strongly in favor of open judicial proceedings and unsealed records., 44
I1. THE WARREN COURT'S INFLUENCE ON PRETRIAL PUBLICITY CASES
A trial by a jury of one's peers has long been recognized as a
safeguard against arbitrary governmental intrusion. 45 However, the
courts have had great difficulty in determining what exactly
constitutes a biased jury.46 The Supreme Court has permitted jurors to
serve even after having admitted to reading newspapers prior to a trial
where such jurors believed they could remain impartial.47 In the
39 GERALD, supra note 11, at 30.
40 GERALD, supra note 11, at 30.
41 GERALD, supra note 11, at 35-36.
42 GERALD, supra note 11, at 40.
43 GERALD, supra note 11, at 41.
44 GERALD, supra note 11, at 43. This standard is provided in Part I1, 8-3-8-
3.7.
45 MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA: RECONCILING FAIR
TRIALS AND A FREE PRESS 41 (1997).
4Id.
47Id. at 43 (stating that in Reynolds v. U.S., Chief Justice Waite believed
"impartiality didn't mean ignorant of the case .. meant juror's mind was not completely
closed to the evidence").
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1960's the Warren Court began reversing criminal convictions based
on adverse pretrial publicity.
48
A. Irvin v. Dowd49
In 1961, the Warren Court became the first to reverse a state
criminal conviction 1on grounds of adverse pre-trial publicity.50 In
Irvin v. Dowd, petitioner brought a habeas corpus proceeding in order
to test the validity of his conviction for murder and sentence of
death.5  The publicity surrounding Irvin's case was substantial.5 2 Six
murders were committed in Indiana and police officials issued press
releases stating that Irvin confessed to these crimes.53  These
statements were highly publicized, along with details of Irvin's past
criminal record. 54  Irvin was granted a change of venue to a
neighboring town. All other requests for a change of .venue were
dismissed pursuant to Indiana law.5 5 The Supreme Court overturned
Irvin's conviction holding that the adverse publicity surrounding
Irvin's trial had led to a strong pattern of prejudice within the county,
which carried over into the courtroom, thereby hindering Irvin's Sixth
Amendment rights. 56
The Warren Court recognized that the "concepts of individual
liberty and of the dignity and worth of every man," rooted in English
law, are safeguarded by the trial by jury.57  The Sixth Amendment
48 Id. at 54. In 1960, the United States Supreme court reversed a lower courts
denial of habeas corpus relief because of prejudicial pretrial publicity in Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717 (1961). Id.
49 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
50 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 389 (showing that a court opposed a criminal
conviction on grounds of adverse pre-trial publicity).
"' Irvin, 366 U.S. at 717.
52 See id. at 719 (stating that the crimes were extensively covered by the news
media and aroused great excitement and indignation in the area).
53 Id. at 720.
5 See id at 725. The stories revealed the details of his background from
more than 20 years ago, including references to crimes committed when he was a
juvenile. Id.
" See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 720. Indiana statute allows only for a single change
of venue. Id.
'6Id. at 726.
57Id. at 721.
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"right to a jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by
a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. The failure to accord an
accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due
process." 58  The Court discussed the question of impartiality, and
applied the test from Reynolds v. United States,59 which states "the
question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact.",60 The Court
also acknowledged Chief Justice Hughes' observation in United States
v. Wood,61 that "impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state
of mind.",62 In finding that adverse publicity affected the jury, the
Court pointed to the fact that 370 of the 430 prospective jurors
admitted during voir dire that they believed Irvin to be guilty. 63 This
preconceived view of the defendant was reflected by eight out of the
twelve jurors placed in the jury box.64 Irvin became a leading case for
the lower courts to rethink their standards when prejudicial publicity
threatens to deprive a defendant of his/her due process rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 65 The courts were advised
to "exert greater care and to be more receptive" to these types of
cases. 66
B. Rideau v. Louisiana
The Supreme Court reversed another conviction based on
adverse publicity in Rideau v. Louisiana.67 Rideau was arrested by
the police for robbing a bank, kidnapping three employees, and killing
one of them. 68 While the Sheriff interrogated Rideau in jail, he
confessed to the crimes.69  The twenty minute "interview" was
58Id. at 722.
59 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
60 Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723.
61 Id. at 724 (citing U.S. v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936)).
62 Id.
631Id. at 727.
64 id.
65 GERALD, supra note 11, at 68 (indicating that it set new constitutional
standards for continuance and change of venue in publicity cases).
66 GERALD, supra note 11, at 68.
67 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
68 Id. at 723.
69Id. at 724.
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televised over the next three days and a large portion of the 150,000
people in the community watched it on their television sets.7 °
Rideau's attorneys filed a motion for a change of venue based on the
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. 7' The motion was denied and Rideau was
convicted and sentenced to death. 72 Of the twelve member jury, three
of the jurors had seen Rideau on television, and two were deputy
sheriffs.73 The Supreme Court stated that "it was a denial of due
process of law to refuse the request for a change of venue, after the
people (of Calcasieu Parish) had been exposed repeatedly and in depth
to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes
with which he was later to be charged., 74
The Court focused on how Rideau's televised interview was
really like a "trial., 75 During the interview, which was in front of the
community, he pled guilty to the murders. 76  Therefore, "any
subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed
to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality."'77 The sheriff
took advantage of the "talkative prisoner" and put Rideau on
television, without a lawyer advising him of his rights.78 The Court
stated that "the televising of a defendant in the act of confessing to a
crime was inherently invalid under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment even without a showing of prejudice or a
70 Id.
71 See id. Rideau's lawyers stated that he would be deprived of his rights to
force him to trial in Calcasieu Parish after the three broadcasts of his 'interview' with the
sheriff. Id.
72 Rideau, 373 U.S. at 724-25.731d. at 725.
741d. at 726.
751 d. "For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be
avoided that this spectacle... in a very real sense was Rideau's trial-at which he pleaded
guilty to murder." Id.
76 Id. at 724.77 Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726.78 See GERALD, supra note 11, at 68 (indicating that "the Supreme Court held
that prejudice generated this way by an official is so conclusive that change of venue and
continuance of trial are automatic."). "No amount of care in jury selection could cure the
prejudice." Id.
N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS.
demonstration of the nexus between the televised confession and the
trial." 79
C. Estes v. Texas
80
In 1965, Estes was convicted of swindling. The Supreme
Court ultimately granted certori to determine whether the broadcast of
Estes' trial had resulted in a violation of his due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 8' The Court responded in the affirmative
and reversed his conviction.82 The pretrial hearing was televised live
and repeated on tape the same evening, reaching approximately
100,000 viewers.83 Moreover, after a panel of prospective jurors was
sworn in, the judge announced that the trial would be televised, thus
increasing the notoriety of Estes and his crime.84 Justice Clark,
delivering the opinion of the court, stated, "pretrial [publicity] can
create a major problem for the defendant in a criminal case. Indeed, it
may be more harmful than publicity during the trial for it may well set
the community opinion as to guilt or innocence., 85  The Court
discussed how the use of television hinders the ascertainment of the
truth in judicial proceedings, thereby causing actual unfairness. 86
Moreover, the media stories concerning a highly publicized trial can
have a negative impact on the jurors,87 the testimony of witnesses, 88
79 See Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 538 (1965) (Clark, J., dissenting); see
also BUNKER, supra note 45, at 56 (contrasting with Irvin in which the court had required
extensive factual proof that prejudice had actually existed).
80 381 U.S. 538 (1965).
81 Id. at 532.
81 Id. at 535.
83 See id. at 536 (indicating that the videotapes show the hearing as not one of
judicial serenity and calm to which the petitioner was entitled). The broadcast was
accomplished by using 12 cameramen who took pictures throughout the hearing and
positioned microphones near the judges' bench, the jury box, and counsel's table. Id.84 Estes, 381 U.S. at 550-51.85 d. at 536.
86 See id at 544 (stating that television in its present state and by its very
nature, reaches into a variety of areas in which it may cause prejudice to an accused).
87 See id at 545 (stating that the potential impact on the jurors is significant
because they are the nerve center of the fact-finding process). The approaching trial was
highly publicized in the news. Id. Every juror brings these facts into the courtroom,
thereby increasing the changes of prejudice. Id.
150 [Vol. XV
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the trial judge, 89 and the defendant. 90  Thus, the Court noted, "the
television camera is a powerful weapon. Intentionally or
inadvertently it can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the
public.'91
D. Sheppard v. Maxwell
92
Sheppard v. Maxwell is the classic case of "trial by
newspaper." 93 After twelve years, the Supreme Court finally reviewed
the case of Sam Sheppard. 94 In July, 1954, Sheppard's pregnant wife,
Marilyn, was bludgeoned to death in the upstairs bedroom of their
home, while Sam Sheppard slept downstairs.95 Sheppard claimed that
he fell asleep downstairs and awoke to hear his wife cry out.9 6 When
he went to their room, he saw a "form" standing by his wife's bed.
97
He attacked the "form" but was knocked unconscious.98  After
regaining consciousness, he checked his wife's pulse, "determined or
thought that she was gone," 99 and ran outside after the form, where he
was again knocked out."' When Sheppard came to his senses, he
called his neighbor, the Mayor, who in turn called the police and
Sheppard's brother.' 0 1 The police searched the house and checked
88Estes, 381 U.S. at 547 (indicating that "the mere fact that the trial is to be
televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as well
as the discovery of the truth.").
89See id. at 548. "[Tlelecasting of a trial is particularly bad when the judge is
elected, then the trial becomes a political weapon. This diverts the judge's attention from
the task at hand-the fair trial of the accused." Id.
90 See Id. at 549. "A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his
day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena." Id.
91 Id.
92 384 U.S. 333 (1966).9 3 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 382.94 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 382.
95 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 336 (indicating that Sheppard and his wife were
watching television in the living room when Sheppard dozed off on the couch, and his
wife went to sleep in the bedroom).96 Id. at 336.
97 id.
98 id.
99 Id.
"o Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 356.
'0' Id. at 336-37.
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Sheppard's alibi.'1 2  From the very beginning of the investigation,
officials focused their suspicions on Sheppard. 10 3  Dr. Gerber, the
coroner, is reported to have stated, "It's evident the doctor did this, so
let's go get the confession out of him."'
10 4
The news media extensively covered the story. As the Ohio
Supreme Court stated:
Murder, mystery, society, sex and suspense were
combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue
and captivate the public fancy to a degree unparalleled
in recent annals . . . circulation-conscious editors
catered to the insatiable interest of the American
public in 'the bizarre... in this atmosphere of a 'Roman
holiday' for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial
for his life.'05
The headlines and editorials of the newspapers guided the
police investigation into the murder. 106 When an editorial titled, Why
No Inquest? Do It Now, Dr. Gerber?, 107 was published, the coroner
called an inquest that day and subpoenaed Sheppard. 108 The televised
three-day inquest was staged in a school gymnasium. 109 Sheppard
was searched in front of the spectators and his attorneys were not
allowed to participate. 10 When Sheppard's chief counsel attempted
to place a document into the record, the coroner forcibly ejected him
from the room."' Sheppard wrote articles and made public press
102 Id. at 337.
.
03 Id at 337.104 /d.
'o5 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 356.
106 See id. at 340 (showing that newspapers emphasized evidence which
tended to incriminate Sheppard, although he wrote feature articles asserting his
innocence).
'
07 Id. at 339.
208/d.
109 Id.
1 o Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 339.
1 Id. at 340 (stating further that the Coroner received cheers, hugs, and
kisses from ladies in the audience).
152 [Vol. XV
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statement asserting his innocence. 1 12  Another headline asked, Why
Isn't Sheppard In Jail?1 3 That night Sheppard was arrested and
charged with murder. 1"4 There were enough articles published in the
three Cleveland newspapers to fill five volumes. 1 5
The case came at a time when both the chief prosecutor and
the judge were up for reelection. 116 The judge allowed the media to
set up a long temporary table inside the bar, and four rows of benches
were also set aside for reporters and the press. 117  Members of
Sheppard's family sat in the last half of the fourth row."'
Newspapers published the names and addresses of the seventy-five
prospective jurors who received anonymous letters and phone calls, as
well as calls from friends about the case. 1 9 Prospective jurors were
constantly bombarded by the press, and allowed to be
photographed. 120  This constant exposure led to all but one juror
reading about the case in the papers, or hearing about it on
television.' 2' Seven of the twelve jurors had daily newspapers
delivered to their homes.1 22 While the jury was being selected, a two-
inch headline asked: But Who Will Speak For Marilyn?123 Many
stories regarding the evidence ran in the newspapers, although such
stories were never actually brought up during the televised trial. 124
Moreover, despite the extensive publicity to which the jury was
exposed, the trial judge refused defense counsel's requests to question
112 Id.
13 Id. at 341 (stating this front page editorial was later titled Quit Stalling--
Bring Him In?).
114 id.
"' Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 342.
116 Id. (explaining that the chief prosecutor was a candidate for common pleas
judge and the trial judge was a candidate to succeed himself).
117 Id. at 342-43.
1" Id. at 343.
119 Id. at 342.
120 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 343.
121 Id. at 345
122 Id.
123 Id. at 346.
124 See id. at 356-57 (indicating that most of the material printed or
broadcasted during the trial was never heard from the witness stand, such as, the charges
that Sheppard had purposely impeded the investigation and must be guilty since he hired
a prominent criminal attorney). He was depicted as a perjurer and an adulterer. Id.
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jurors as to what they had seen or heard. 125 Therefore, the Supreme
Court concluded that some of the material did reach the jurors. 126
The Supreme Court distinguished Sheppard from Estes. 127 At
the outset of this case, the judge announced that he was not restricting
prejudicial news stories.128 Sheppard was not granted a change of
venue, the jury was not sequestered, and the Sheppard jury saw all the
television broadcasts from the courtroom.129 The press coverage of
the Sheppard trial was more intense and pervasive than the Estes
trial. 130  The judge's lack of precautions concerning the pretrial
publicity turned the trial into a "carnival atmosphere," and clearly
affected Sheppard's right to a fair trial"'
Suggestions were set forth by the Supreme Court on how the
trial judge should have protected Sheppard from the prejudicial
media. 132 Strict rules should have been implemented by the judge in
governing the use of the courtroom by reporters. 133  Moreover, the
witnesses should have been insulated from the news media to keep
testimony from being disclosed. 134 The trial court should have made
some effort to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to
the press by police officers, witnesses, and counsel for both sides. 13
125 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 347. The trial judge stated, "Well, I don't know,
we can't stop people, in any event, from listening to it." Id. "It is a matter of free speech
and the court can't control everybody . . . we are not going to harass the jury every
morning.. . I have confidence in the jury." Id.
126 Id. at 357.
127 Id. at 352-53.
.
28 Id. at 353.
129 Id. at 354.
130 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 352-53.
131 Id. at 358.
132 Id. at 358-59. Many of the suggestions concerned the way the trial was
conducted. Id. Such as, the judge should have adopted stricter rules governing the use of
the courtroom by the newsmen, as Sheppard's counsel requested. Id.
133 Id. at 358 (indicating that the number of reporters should have been
limited and their conduct regulated at the first sign of disruption within the courtroom).
134 Id. at 359.
... Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 359-60. Much of the information disclosed was
inaccurate. Id. The defense counsel brought this problem to the attention of the judge,
who should have at least warned the news reporters to check the accuracy of their stories.
Id. The judge could have also controlled the statements made to the news media by the
participants in thejudicial proceeding. Id.
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Another precautionary measure that could have been taken is the
prohibition against extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party,
witness, or court official. 136 Furthermore, the judge also could have
asked a city or county official to promulgate a regulation concerning
the dissemination of information about the case by their employees. 1
37
Considering the totality of the circumstances the trial judge should
have imposed stricter guidelines during the trial.'33 All of these
suggested methods for controlling pretrial publicity became known as
the Sheppard Mandate. 139
The Supreme Court recognized the pervasiveness of modern
communications in judicial proceedings and acknowledged that "the
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is
never weighed against the accused."'140 The Court suggested
collaboration between counsel and the press as to information
affecting the fairness of the trial.14 1 The Supreme Court reversed
Sheppard's denial of habeas corpus holding that "the trial judge did
not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial
publicity which saturated the community and to control the disruptive
influences in the courtroom."'
' 42
111. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SHEPPARD MANDATE
A. People v. Manson
The California Court of Appeals, in People v. Manson,143
illustrated how to successfully use the Sheppard decision as a
guideline for trial judges to guarantee a fair trial as required by the
Sixth Amendment. 44 Although the case received enormous publicity
16 Id. at 361.
I37 d. at 362.
I38 d. at 352.
139 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 58.
1'4 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362.
141 Id. at 363.
142 id.
143 People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App.3d 102 (Cal. 1976).
144 Id. at 191. The court issued silence orders, conducted a controlled and
searching voir dire, properly admonished the jury and implemented court procedures to
156 N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XV
the court established many safeguards to ensure that the jury was not
unduly prejudiced. 145
In Manson, appellants lived in a commune under the
leadership of Charles Manson. 146 In the late 1960's, Manson became
associated with many young runaways, and began traveling around
the country with them in his bus. ' 47 He eventually organized and led a
commune in California, consisting of about twenty people who
became known as the "Family."' 148 This group "rejected conventional
organizations and values of society."' 149 The appellants were part of
this Family. 15 The Family members regarded Manson as "Christ"
and believed that he "sees all and knows all."' 151
In order to begin a racial war, 152 which Manson called "Helter
Skelter," he told the appellants to perform two multiple homicides. 53
The first murder was of Sharon Tate and four other people at her
house. 154 They were stabbed, shot, and the word "Pig" was written in
her blood on the door. 155  The following night, Manson took
appellants to the LaBianca house, where the husband and wife were
afford appellants a dignified and restrained atmosphere. Id. The jury was selected from a
diverse population and sequestered for the entire guilt phase of the trial. Id.; see also,
KANE, supra note 2, at 26 (stating that the Judge prohibited any extrajudicial statements
about the case, thereby following a suggestion from Sheppard).
145 Manson, 61 Cal. App.3d at 191 (stating the court implemented procedures
to afford appellants a dignified and restrained trial atmosphere).
'Id. at 102.147 1d. at 126-27.
148 Manson, 61 Cal. App.3d at 127. This became the group's name even
though none of the members were related by blood or marriage except for the mothers
and children. Id.
1491 Id. at 127.
"'o Id. By August 1969, the commune included Susan Atkins, Patricia
Krenwinkel, Leslie Van Houten and two other co-indictees Charles Tex Watson and
Linda Kasabian. Id.
15' Id. at 128. Members testified that they never question Manson because he
was always right. Id.
1521d. at 129.
153 Manson, 61 Cal.App.3d. at 129. 'Helter Skelter' was a song by the
Beatles who Manson believed were speaking to him and warning of the imminent conflict
between blacks and whites. Id.154 KANE, supra note 2, at 23.
155 Manson, 61 Cal.App.3d. at 124-25.
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stabbed and killed. 156 The Court of Appeals held that massive pretrial
publicity did not deprive defendants of a fair trial. 5 7  The Court
concluded that an "independent examination of the record and the voir
dire proceeding reveal[ed] that appellants ... received a fair and
impartial trial." '158 Therefore, the appellants Charles Manson, Patricia
Krenwinkel, and Susan Atkins were found guilty of murder and
conspiracy and sentenced to life imprisonment. 159 The conviction of
Leslie Van Houten was reversed for retrial because the disappearance
of her counsel, Ronald Hughes, resulted in a denial of effective
counsel. 160
The nature of the crime and the circumstances surrounding the
Manson case were intensely covered by the media.' 6 ' The murders
even received international notoriety.162  "Details of the Tate-
LaBianca murders were laid before the public colorfully embroidered
with the backgrounds, histories, and aberrant lifestyles of appellants
and other members of the Family."'' 63 The Court denied a change of
venue, stating "[the] nature of modem communications media limits
the effectiveness of both continuances and change of venue.'164
Furthermore, the judge concluded that since the case was covered so
extensively, the potential jury pool would be larger in Los Angeles,
156 KANE, supra note 2, at 24.
157Manson, 61 Cal.App.3d. at 103.
'
58 Id. at 191.
I ld. at 123-24. A jury found all appellants guilty as charged and further
found the murders to be of the first degree. Id. After the death penalty the same jury
imposed death sentences upon all appellants. Id. The resulting judgment was appealed
directly to the California Supreme Court (Cal. Pen. Code, § 1239(b)). Id. While this case
was pending that Court decided People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958, invalidating the death penalty. On that basis, these appeals were
transferred to this court for determination. Id.
160 Manson, 61 Cal. App.3d at 217.
161 Id. at 173. "The media's revelations focused primarily on the savageness
of the killings, the absence of clues revealing the identity of the perpetrators, and certain
details about the private lives and relationships of the victims." Id.
16 Id. at 174.163 id.
164 Id. at 177 (stating Manson's refusal to waive a right to a speedy trial
eliminated continuance as an available solution).
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and nothing would be gained from changing the trial location. 165  In
addition to the massive news coverage, the participants of the trial
also contributed their own accounts of the murders. 166 The, appellant,
Susan Atkins, was allowed to leave her jail cell to conduct a tape
recorded interview, for which she received $80,000.167 These events
persisted in spite of the judge's clear order prohibiting all public
discussion of the case by those involved. 168
The Supreme Court discussed precedent concerning a
defendant's right to a fair trial and the effect of the press.
169
Moreover, it acknowledged that "the California Supreme Court ha[d]
embraced the holding of Sheppard and taken its cue from the
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice." 170 The Court had to decide during voir dire of each
potential juror whether the media adversely affected the accused. 171
The Manson voir dire involved in depth discussion as to publicity, and
the court permitted inquiry by each appellant's counsel in order to
screen for any impartial jurors. 172  Any prospective juror who was
familiar with Atkin's published confession was excused.173 Also, the
"court specifically admonished the prospective jurors to avoid all
publicity.' ' 174  Furthermore, the Court discussed the doctrine of
165 KAN, supra note 2, at 29 (indicating that change in venue would serve no
purpose because of the publicity of the trial and that the jury pool was larger in the Los
Angeles area).
166 Manson, 61 Cal.App.3d. at 177-78. A Deputy District Attorney gave an
"off-the-record" interview with Rolling Stone magazine. Id. at 178.
167 Id. at 27. This story was leaked to the L.A. Times. Id.
168 See K'AN, supra note 2, at 27-29. The post-Sheppard press guidelines
developed by the American Bar Association stated that it was improper to publish stories
discussing a defendant's possible confession, any tests (lie detector or others) involved,
past criminal record or character of the defendant, the credibility of witnesses, or anything
else that might inflame public opinion against the defendant. Id.
169 Manson, 61 Cal. App.3d. at 181-87. The court discussed Irvin, Rideau,
Estes, and Sheppard. Id.
7 1d. at 184.
I7 d. at 181-82 (explaining the Manson Court cited Irvin without fixing any
determination of a high probability of prejudice).
172 Id. at 187-88 (showing that the careful examination by the court in
screening jurors could possibly be contaminated).
173 Id. at 185 (showing that if jurors were aware of the Atkins' confession,
they would have been excused).
174Manson, 61 Cal.App.3d at 188.
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presumed prejudice.' 75  However, the Court distinguished Rideau,
because the case at hand did not involve televised broadcasts of
defendant confessing to the crime. 176 The Court noted that the trial
judge excluded any prospective juror who read Susan Atkin's
confession.177 Moreover, the trial judge conducting the Manson case
imposed many safeguards such as sequestering the jury and strictly
regulating the activity of the news media. 178  Based upon the above
precautions, the Court decided that "although the publicity
surrounding this case was massive, it did not detract from '[t]he
solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled." 179
The trial judge tried to the best of his ability to shield the
jurors from the publicity, especially the stories that were orchestrated
by the participants of the trial.180 Also, statements made by President
Nixon were meant to be kept from the jury, 181 The influence of the
Sheppard Mandate was apparent. 182 The judges involved with the trial
"used the power available to them to protect the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial without violating the First Amendment
rights of the news media."' 183
1"Id. at 182 (indicating that in Rideau, the Court looked to the due process
requirement of a trial before ajury drawn from a population of people who had never seen
the defendant confessing on videotape).
1' Id. at 185.
177 id.
178 Id. at 186. The court distinguished Manson from Estes and Sheppard. Id.
179 Manson, 61 Cal.App.3d. at 186. Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard "cannot be
made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about a state
defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged
alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process." Id.
180 KANE, supra note 2, at 29 (showing how the judge attempted to protect the
jurors by sequestering them).
181 KANE, supra note 2, at 30-31. Nixon observed that Manson was "guilty,
directly or indirectly, of eight murders without reason." Id. The next morning the Los
Angeles times featured a large type banner headline that said, "MANSON GUILTY
NIXON DECLARES." Id. Extra precautions were taken to shield the jury, by painting
the windows of the bus, however, defendant Manson brought a copy of the paper himself
into the courtroom and showed it to the jury. Id.
182 Manson, 61 App.3d. at 183-84 (showing how the court in Manson had
been coping with the media and how the court had looked to the mandate in Sheppard for
guidance).
183 y kE, supra note 2, at 32.
N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS.
B. United States v. McVeigh
Although the courts have been implementing guidelines for
lawyers to follow during a specific trial, the media still plays a huge
role in society today. 184  The prevalence of the media makes it
imperative that a judge consider ways to remedy the possible harm
caused by media coverage to a case. 185 Therefore, the judge can best
determine how to properly ensure that the defendant will receive a fair
and impartial jury.
Timothy McVeigh bombed a federal building in Oklahoma
City on April 19, 1995, and was subsequently charged and convicted
of the crime. 186 One hundred and sixty eight people died in the blast,
and eight hundred were injured. 187  The court granted a change of
venue to Denver, Colorado "because the entire state had become a
unified community, sharing the emotional trauma of those who had
been directly victimized.' 88  At the beginning of the criminal
proceeding, an Order was issued regarding the disclosure of discovery
materials. 189 The court was later asked to make a decision regarding
extrajudicial statements by attorneys and support personnel.' 90 This
decision acknowledged the concerns of defense counsel as to the
prejudicial effect of the press reporting. "The resources, creativity
184 GERALD, supra note 11, at 73 (stating that "despite guidelines to regulate
lawyers' roles during a trial; the media still has a huge influence on the trial").
185 GERALD, supra note 11, at 73 (stating that the court considered one or
more of the following remedies: continuance, change of venue, voir dire, sequestration of
the jury, cautioning of extrajudicial statements, screening prejudiced jurors during voir
dire, and granting of a new trial).
186 U.S. v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp 756, 758 (D. Col. 1996) (showing that
McVeigh was arrested and convicted of the bombing).
187 Jo Thomas, News Article on Bombing Raises Fears for Trial, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar 2, 1997, at A23 (stating that 168 people died in the blast).
188McVeigh, 955 F. Supp. at 1282 (quoting the court's rationale for a change
of venue).
189 Id. at 756-57. The Agreed Discovery Order was signed which included
the following provision: Discovery materials may be disclosed only to the parties, their
counsel and agents, except that such materials may be disclosed as necessary: (a) during
court proceedings, including trial, hearings or legal filings in this case; or (b) to potential
witnesses, provided that such witnesses are made aware of and agree to honor the terms of
this protective order. Id.
190 Id. at 757 (showing how the court was asked by the prosecution to restrict
any extra judicial statements).
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and competitiveness of the news industry became evident in
exhaustive efforts to satisfy public curiosity about the accused."191
The defense counsel played an active role in trying to counter
negative publicity regarding the defendant.' 92  The court, however,
still needed to articulate standards to be adhered to during the trial. 193
The court ordered that: no lawyer will release information or opinion
about the criminal proceeding, all counsel must take reasonable
precautions to prevent the participants of the trial, including court
support staff, from releasing information that is not in the public
record, and no extrajudicial statements by the lawyers are allowed
before the jury is empanelled. 194  These specific restrictions were
placed on the content of the extrajudicial statements in order to
decrease the adverse effects of the publicity surrounding the case.195
News articles stated that Timothy McVeigh "told his lawyers
that he had driven the truck used in the bombing and that he decided
on a daytime attack to insure a 'body count."' 196 This article was
printed the day the questionnaires to prospective jurors were due in
Federal District Court in Denver. 9 7  There were also stories that
McVeigh, along with Michael Fortier, a witness, robbed the National
Guard Armory in 1994.19'
As a precaution, a letter enclosed in the jury summons stated
that the jurors would not be sequestered, but warned that they should
begin immediately being careful what they read and hear on the
191 Id. at 758.
192 Id. at 757. The government questioned the propriety of the defendants
lead counsel in generating publicity by his comments in news conferences, interviews,
and public statements. Id.
193 McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. at 760. "Concerning the following matters related
to the case: prior criminal record, the content of statements made by or refused by
defendant to law enforcement officers, examination performance or the refusal by
defendant to submit to any examination, information concerning prospective witnesses,
the possibility of guilty pleas, and any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of defendant,
or as to the merits of the case." Id.
'
94 Id. at 760-61.
195 Id.
196 Thomas, supra note 187 (showing that McVeigh bombed the building
during the day to ensure a higher "body-count").
197 Thomas, supra note 187.
198 Thomas, supra note 187.
N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS.
news.' 99 After defense counsel reviewed the questionnaires, they
requested that the start of the trial be delayed because pretrial
publicity had tainted the jury pool. 20 0  The court denied the request
stating that "any consideration of the matter by this court would be
premature and uninformed.",
20 1
"The trial court has broad discretion in gauging the effects of
the allegedly prejudicial publicity, and in taking responsive measures
to ensure a fair trial.",2 2 Although the press is still a part of high
profile cases, courts continue to apply the Sheppard Mandate to
ensure a fair trial.
IV. VOIR DIRE
A. The Mind of the Juror
Attitudes concerning a juror's knowledge of pretrial publicity
have changed over the years.20 3 In the 1950's and 1960's, judges and
lawyers sought jurors who were virtually ignorant of the facts
surrounding the case.20 4 However, with the intensive media coverage
of many high profile cases, it has become understood that complete
ignorance is highly unlikely. 20 5 Now the questioning of prospective
jurors is relied on as a more dependable measure by judges and
lawyers to determine whether a juror has preformed his or her
opinion. 206 "The rule is that [jurors must] be able to put whatever
199 Thomas, supra note 187.
200 Julie Delcour, Strike Three: Trio of Trial Delay Bids Denied; McVeigh 's
Lawyer Says "Worst Fears " are Confirmed, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 29, 1997, at Al.
201 Id.
202 Id,
203 John D. McKinnon, 'Fair-Trial, Free-Press' Debate Rages in O.J. Case,
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1994, at B5.
204 Id. Professor Harold Sullivan, an advocate of strict controls concerning
publicity, stated, "the minds of a jury may be likened to 12 test tubes. What scientist
would commence an experiment with 12 test tubes, soiled and discolored by the deposits
of repeated experiments?" Id.
205 See generally id.
2 06 id.
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knowledge they have aside and be governed by the evidence and the
instructions of the judge." 20 7
However, some believe it is a myth that the jury selection
process is an effective instrument for identifying biases because there
are not many opportunities to identify whether a person has a certain
prejudgment about a case or if they have been exposed to pretrial
publicity.2 8 It is also acknowledged that general media information
that resembles the case on trial may have an adverse influence on a
jury's ability toeffectively evaluate the trial evidence.20 9
The ABA has also established a standard of juror
acceptability. 210 The rule promotes the identification and rejection of
an impartial juror.21' It also recognizes that a juror should be
evaluated in order to determine whether the person can be flexible and
fair.
2 12
B. Mu Min v. Virginia
The Supreme Court recently held that a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury and his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process were not violated when the trial judge, during voir
dire, refused to question prospective jurors about specific contents of
news reports to which they had been exposed. 1 3 Petitioner Dawud
Majid Mu'Min was convicted of murdering a woman and was
sentenced to death. 14 Mu'Min was assigned to a supervised work
207 Id. (quoting David Kendall).
208 Leslie Boellstorff, Professor Says Myth Surround Jury Trials Steven
Penrod, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 28, 1996, at 1. Steven Penrod, Director of the
Law and Psychology program at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln believes this point.
Id.
209 Id.
210 See GERALD, supra note 11, at 77. Standard 8-3.5 of the 1979 approved
text of Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice: Fair Trial and Free
Press was influenced by Irvin and Sheppard.
211 See GERALD, supra note 11, at 77.
212 See GERALD, supra note 11, at 77. "By rule, some information in the mind
of a prospective juror is deemed damaging beyond repair, such as reports of confessions."
Id. "[B]ut the effect of information that tends to indicate guilt has to be evaluated by the
quite brief and intuitive selection process." Id.
213 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
2 4 Id. at 417.
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detail, but during his lunch break he escaped. 21 5 He then murdered
and robbed a female owner of a carpet store, and returned to his work
crew. 16 There was a considerable amount of pre-trial publicity
regarding Mu'Min's case. 217 The details of the crime were displayed
on the front pages of local papers, and facts concerning Mu'Min's
prior murder conviction, for which he was currently serving in prison,
were revealed.218 The press also disclosed that the murder could have
been avoided if the State was allowed to seek the death penalty in
Mu'Min's prior murder case.2 19  Mu'Min was denied a motion for
change of venue, as well as a motion for individual voir dire.22°
Mu'Min also submitted a proposed list of voir dire questions.22 ' His
list of questions concerning the conterit of the news items to which
prospective jurors may have been exposed were also denied.222
The majority refused to extend the right of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause to encompass questions specifically
dealing with the content of each juror's knowledge. 221 The Court
relied upon the trial judge's discretion in determining whether the voir
dire questions yielded impartial jurors. 224 "Credibility determinations
215 Id. at 418.
2161d
"
217 Id. (indicating that three months before the trial Mu'Min submitted 47
newspaper articles in a request for a change of venue).2 11MU MMin, 500 U.S. at 436-37. Readers of the local papers learned that the
victim had been discovered in a pool of blood, with her clothes pulled off and semen on
her body. Id. Readers also learned that Mu'Min confessed to the crime. Id. A front-
page story described the details of Petitioner's 1973 murder of a cab driver. Id.
219 Id. at 437. "In a story headlined 'Mu'Min avoided death for 1973 murder
in Va.,' one paper reported that but for this Court's decision a year earlier in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which temporarily invalidated the death penalty, the
prosecutor at the earlier trial would have had a case of capital murder." Id.
220 Id. at 419 (summarizing the trial court's decision to begin voir dire with
collective questioning of venire, but that venire could be broken into panels of four in
order to deal with publicity).
221 Id. Some of the requested questions were, "Have you acquired any
information about this case from the newspapers, television, conversations, or any other
source?," and "Have you discussed the case with anyone?" Id.
222 Id. (listing questions that were not allowed such as, "When and where did
you get this information?").
22 3 Mu Min, 500 U.S. at 431-32.
224 Id. at 422 (quoting Rosalez-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189
(1981)).
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of this kind are entitled to 'special deference,"' 225 because the trial
judge is in the area of the population where the community is said to
have been affected by pretrial publicity.226 Nevertheless, eight of the
twelve jurors admitted to being exposed to the case through the press
and media.227 They stated, however, that they had no preconceived
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Mu'Min.228
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his dissent, recognized this as
the first time the Court had been called upon to address the procedures
necessary to assure the protection of the right to an impartial jury
under the Sixth Amendment. 229 His disagreement with the majority
opinion is apparent from the first sentence of his dissent which states,
"today's decision turns a critical constitutional guarantee-the Sixth
Amendment's right to an impartial jury-into a hollow formality." 230
To Justice Marshall, the majority's conclusion that the trial court had
no obligation to ask what the potential jurors knew about the case was
unacceptable.2 31  "When a prospective juror has been exposed to
prejudicial pretrial publicity, a trial court cannot realistically assess
the juror's impartiality without first establishing what the juror has
already learned about the case." 232
Justice Marshall set forth three reasons why content
questioning should be required in cases where a prospective juror
admits to pretrial publicity exposure. 3  The first reason is that
content questioning is necessary to determine whether the exposure to
publicity was significant enough to disqualify the juror as a matter of
law.3 The second reason refers to the fact that although publicity
may not be significant enough to disqualify an individual, the court
225 Id. at 433.
21 Id. at 427.
117 Id. at 421.
228 MU Min, 500 U.S. at 417.
229 Id. at 439.
130 Id. at 433.
231 Id, at 434.
232 Id.
233 Min, 500 U.S. at 441.
234 Id. (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1038 (1984)) ("Our cases recognize
that, under certain circumstances, exposure too particularly inflammatory publicity
creates so strong a presumption of prejudice that the jurors' claims that they can be
impartial should not be believed.").
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still needs in-depth information as to whether the juror is impartial. 235
The third reason relates to the promotion of accurate trial court fact
finding. 236 In accordance with the above reasons, Justice Marshall
believed that content questioning should have been used during voir
dire. 237 The trial judge could have done more to ensure juror
impartiality. 238 Although the prospective jurors were questioned as to
whether or not they had been exposed to the story, the jurors were not
asked about the source or content of prior knowledge.23 Moreover,
two-thirds of the jurors selected admitted to having been exposed to
the publicity.240 The judge's awareness of the media coverage should
not be substituted for the knowledge of the potential jury's
awareness. 241
V. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The courts need to balance the Sixth Amendment rights of the
defendant with the First Amendment rights of the press in order to
have a fair trial.242 At times these two groups may clash, and then the
judge needs to decide whose rights will prevail. 243 Two lines of cases
that involve the court restraining free speech stemmed from the
Sheppard Mandate and the ABA standards.244 The first line involves
the court ordering journalists not to publish items of news heard in
open court.245 The second involves orders closing courts or sealing
235 Id. at 442-43. By asking the prospective juror in addition to identify what
he has read or heard about the case and what corresponding impressions he has formed,
the trial court is able to confirm that the impartiality that the juror professes is the same
impartiality that the Sixth Amendment demands. Id.
236 Id. at 443; see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1038 (stating that the
impartiality "determination is essentially one of credibility").237 Id. at 444.238 MU Min, 500 U.S. at 445.
239 Id. at 419.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 445.
242 KANE, supra note 2, at xii.
243 GERALD, supra note 11, at 89. The courts have no unified voice, even the
First Amendment cases have resulted in divided opinions in the Supreme Court. Id.
244 GERALD, supra note 11, at 89.
245 GERALD, supra note 11, at 89.
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documents, including grand jury reports, which are not yet entered
into evidence. 2
46
A. Media Restraints
A prior restraint is a judicial order which prevents the media
from publishing materials already in its hands.247 Many courts have
been unwilling to issue such a direct restriction on the press. 248 Courts
are more likely to restrict the comments of the trial participants,
through gag orders, than to impose direct restraints on the press.249
The strong presumption in the Supreme Court against the use of prior
restraints has resulted in an almost universal rejection of restraints in
lower federal criminal court cases.25 ° However, the courts have not
settled on a consistent approach to balancing the interests.
251
In Near v. Minnesota,252 a landmark decision, the Supreme
Court struck down a Minnesota statute that allowed courts to enjoin a
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical., 25 3  Petitioner owned an anti-Semitic newspaper which
regularly criticized city officials for being corrupt. 254 The statute was
declared unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendment.255  Chief Justice Hughes wrote that the statute
impermissibly restrained speech because the publication was
completely suppressed.256 Although the Court did not state any test as
to when a prior restraint may be constitutional, it did note a few select
circumstances under which a prior restraint would be held
constitutional. 257
246 GERALD, supra note 11, at 89.
247 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 65.
248 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 66.
249 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 66.
250 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 70.
251 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 84.
252 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
253 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 66.
254 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 66.
255 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 66.
256 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 66.
257 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 66. These included publication of military
information in wartime, obscenity, and incitement to overthrow the government. Id.
N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS.
In 1971, the Supreme Court held a prior restraint on the
publication of a classified government study concerning Vietnam to
be unconstitutional. 258  Again the Court did not express any test to
measure when the government might overcome the heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity. 259
After the Sheppard Mandate, there was a steady increase in
the issuing of gag orders in newsworthy cases. 260  These orders fall
into three general categories. First, orders seeking to limit
statements made to the press by lawyer's, parties, witnesses and
sometimes, outsiders;262 second, "orders that purport to tell the press
directly what it may or may not publish; '263 and third, "orders sealing
court records and proceedings from the press and public." 264
In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart,265 applied the prior restraint doctrine to a court order that
silenced the press in a criminal trial.266 The Court struck down a state
court's gag order on news coverage of a sensational murder trial in a
small Nebraska town as failing to meet the heavy burden required by
the First Amendment. 267  The Court set forth a balancing test for
judges to use in evaluating a prior restraint in a criminal trial context:
(1) "the nature and extent of pretrial coverage," (2) whether some
alternative judicial action could reduce the effect of coverage, and (3)
whether a prior restraint would effectively protect the defendant's
28 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 67 (discussing New York Times Co. v. U.S.,
403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
259 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 66.
260 DVOL, supra note 12, at 404. Fred P. Graham conducted an informal,
unscientific sampling composed of all reported cases, and all additional unreported cases
cited in law review articles, and concluded that the problem with gag orders started in the
late 1960's. Id. Until 1966, the year Sheppard v. Maxwell was decided and the adoption
of the ABA Standards on Fair Trials and Free Press, the sampling did not discover any
gag orders. Id.
261 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 405.
262 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 405.
263 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 404.
264 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 405.
265 Bunker, supra note 45, at 68.
266 Bunker, supra note 45, at 68.
267 Bunker, supra note 45, at 68.
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right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.268 Moreover, the
majority acknowledged a defendant's right to a trial by an impartial
jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, but stated that under the
facts of the case, the First Amendment rights of the press outweighed
those rights. 269 The Court stated ,"commentary and reporting on the
criminal justice system is at the core of First Amendment values, for
the operation and integrity of that system is the crucial import to
citizens concerned with the administration of government. Secrecy of
judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts." 270
US. v. Noriega271 is the only reported case in the federal
courts to have upheld a prior restraint on a criminal justice related
matter since Nebraska Press.272 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit approved a temporary restraint on Cable
News Network which forbid the network from broadcasting
audiotapes of telephone conversations between deposed Manuel
Noreiga and his defense team.273 The Panamanian leader was brought
by force to the United States to stand trial for drug-related charges.
274
The Eleventh Circuit stated that trial judges have broad discretion in
ensuring that the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants are
protected, including taking steps that might adversely affect First
Amendment interests.275 Regarding this conflict of interests, the court
wrote "when the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon
Sixth Amendment rights, the former must nevertheless yield to the
later. ' 276  However, the Court did state that some showing of
immediate danger to the defendant's trial is necessary to override First
268 Bunker, supra note 45, at 68. (stating that after "examining these facts of
the case[,] the court concluded that a prior restraint was not constitutionally
permissible").
269 Bunker, supra note 45, at 68. Chief Justice Burger stated that "[tihe
authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between the First
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment rights," and that the Nebraska Press Court would
not do so either. Id.
270 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976).
271 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990).
272 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 75.
273 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 75.
274 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 75.
275 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 76.
276 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 76.
17 N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS.
Amendment protections.277 These measures were unable to stop leaks
and proved unavailing at the -trial.278
B. Closure of Hearings to the Press
The. First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. '' 279 The press' fight for a
more expansive interpretation of the First Amendment has influenced
the Supreme Court's decisions on how and when to limit this right.280
The freedom of expression is guaranteed to the citizens of the United
States, including the press, in the First Amendment. Courts must
strike a balance between the importance of a defendants right to a fair
trial and the press' right to report the trial and surrounding
information.28'
History shows that public access to trials has long be regarded
as an important aspect of the justice system. 282 "'The conduct of trials
before as many people as choose to attend' was regarded as one of the
inestimable advantages of a free English constitution of
government., 283 A recurring problem in American courts, however,
has been whether or not to close the trial to the public. 284 In response,
the ABA adopted trial standards to help the courts deal with
publicity. 285  Trial Standard 3.1, in its original text, allowed the
defendant to make a motion to move that "all or part of the hearing be
277 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 76.
278 BUNKER, supra note 45, at 79.
279 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
280 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 371.
281 KANE, supra note 2, at 90-91.
282 See GERALD, supra note 11, at 108 (citing Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia). 283DEVOL, supra note 12, at 398.
284 See Gannet v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, n.19 (1979) (documenting
exceptions to the general "public trial" rule).
285 GERALD, supra note 11, at 87.
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held in chambers, or otherwise closed to the public. '286 For a brief
period, this rule led to the closing of courts.287 It was never approved
by the Supreme Court, however, because it was a substantial departure
from custom.2 88  In 1979, the ABA acknowledged the press' First
Amendment right and prohibited direct restraint on the media.2 9
Specifically, Standard 8-3.1 states, "no rule of court or judicial order
shall be promulgated that prohibits representatives of the news media
from broadcasting or publishing any information in their possession
relating to a criminal case.."290 Although the First Amendment is
written in absolutist language,291 the Supreme Court has never
accepted the view that it prohibits all government regulation of
expression. 292 "The guarantees of the First Amendment are rights
rather than privileges - rights that remain intact (with few exceptions)
regardless of how they are used."293
In 1979, the Supreme Court held, in Gannett Co, Inc. v.
DePasquale,294 that judges were allowed to close pretrial hearings and
suggested the same for trials. 295 "The Court made clear that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the accused a right to a public trial. 29
6
Exactly one year later, the Supreme Court decided Richmond
286 GERALD, supra note 11, at 87. Standard 3.1, in the original text, states that
in any preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or other pretrial hearing in a criminal case,
including a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant may move that all or part of the
hearing be held in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, including representatives of
news media, on the grounds that dissemination of evidence or argument adduced at the
hearing may disclose matters that will be inadmissible in evidence at the trial and
therefore likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Id. The
motion shall be granted unless the presiding officer determines there is no substantial
likelihood of such inference. Id.
287 GERALD, supra note 11, at 87.
288 GERALD, supra note 11, at 87.
289 See GERALD, supra note 11, at 65.
290 See GERALD, supra note 11, at 65.
291 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
750(1997).
292 Id.
293 See KANE, supra note 2, at 91.
294 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
295 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 397.
296 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 398.
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Newspaper v. Virginia.29 7 Justice Burger wrote, "the right to attend
criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment;
without freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press
could be eviscerated."' 298  The Court held that the Constitution
allowed for the closing of trials only in the most extraordinary
circumstances.
VI. SOLUTIONS AND REMEDIES
Three solutions to the implication of "trial by newspaper"
have been widely discussed. 299  The first suggestion is voluntary
adherence by the news media to a code that would demand restrained
treatment of criminal coverage. 300  However, this code is only as
effective as the media wants it to be.3°t  The second method is to
follow the lead of England by laying a heavy hand on the press
302 Hwvr h urmthrough the contempt powers of the court. However, the Supreme
Court has given the press great freedom in reporting cases before the
bar. In 1941, Bridges v. California30 3 and Times-Mirror Co. v.
Superior Cour 4 were jointly decided because they both dealt with
out-of-court contempt cases. 3° 5 The Court adopted a more restrictive
standard that a "clear and present danger to the administration of
justice-not just a possible threat-would have to be established in order
for a court to substantiate out-of-court contempt."30 6  The final
297 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 397. Although, the decision was 7-1, there was
no majority opinion because the seven justices wrote six different opinions. Id.
298 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 398 (quoting Branzburg v. Hanes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972)).
299 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 375.
300 DEVOL, supr note 12, at 375. The press would agree to turn to the more
significant aspects of American justice and away from the sensational aspects which
normally are used to boost circulation. Id. Voluntary media codes of restraint have not
been particularly successful in the past. Id.
301 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 375.
302 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 376.
303 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
304 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
305 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 376-77.
306 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 376-77.
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proposal of controlling pre-trial publicity is to govern the flow of
information at the source, i.e.: at those legally under the jurisdiction of
the court. 307
Courts should control attorneys who make extrajudicial
statements because these comments may sway public opinion, which
could lead to a tainted jury pool.308 The Sheppard court stated that
"where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to
trial will prevent a fair trial," the trial court must take precautions to
prevent such an occurrence. 30 9  The prosecutor and the defense
attorney are the two most likely sources of extrajudicial statements.
Courts may limit the speech of attorneys only if (1) the
limitations further an important or substantial
government interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression by counsel, and (2) the restriction must be
no greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular government interest
involved.310
In United States v. Simon,3 11 the government attorney refused
to agree to a pretrial agreement limiting extrajudicial statements. 312 In
holding that the U.S. Attorney was not allowed to make any
extrajudicial comments, the Court stated "to have the prosecutor
himself feed the press with evidence that no self-restrained press
ought to publish in anticipation of a trial is to make the State itself,
through the prosecutor who wields power, a conscious participant in
trial by newspaper."'3 13 The United States Department of Justice, in
307 DEVOL, supra note 12, at 376-77. This method was approved by the ABA
in 1968 with the adoption of the Reardon Report. Id. Under this standard the judge
would limit the amount of information available to the press from the prosecutor, defense
attorney, police and others directly involved in the case. Id.
308 Howard, supra note 1, at 67.
309 Howard, supra note 1, at 67.
310 Howard, supra note 1, at 67.
311 664 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
312 id.
313 Howard, supra note 1, at 68 (quoting the powerful dissent of Justice
Frankfurter in Stroble v. California).
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fact, has a detailed guideline of what can and cannot be said to the
press during a criminal trial.1
1 4
Some lawyers use the "open" approach regarding the
attorney's relationship with the media before and during the criminal
trial.315 This "open" approach uses the media as a litigation tool to be
used as part of the trial strategy, or even personal strategy.316
Moreover, this approach enables the attorney to use the media to the
client's advantage. 317 When the attorney initiates communication with
the media, the attorney controls what is being released.3 t8 Therefore,
public information is often from the perspective of the client and not
truly objective.319
VII. CONCLUSION
The First and Sixth Amendments will continue to be at odds
with one another in regard to highly publicized cases, unless a balance
is struck between a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial and the
media's right to freely report.32°  The press's freedom to
sensationalize information makes this goal very difficult to obtain.1
2 1
The Warren Court set the standard for judges to ensure a fair
trial.322 These guidelines have been effectively implemented in
314 Howard, supra note 1, at 68. Extrajudicial statements by Department of
Justice personnel cannot be made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a criminal
trial, must be limited to matters of public record that do not impinge on the defendant's
rights to a fair trial and uncontroverted facts, and should be strenuously avoided when
possible during the period approaching and during the trial. Id.
31 Howard, supra note 1, at 64. The most prominent attorney using this
approach is Robert Shapiro, who was one of O.J. Simpson's defense attorneys. Id.
316 Howard, supra note 1, at 64.
317 Howard, supra note 1, at 65.
318 Howard, supra note 1, at 65.
319 Howard, supra note 1, at 65.
320 See KANE, supra note 2, at xvi. "A secure and free society must perceive
that its legal system is-operating fairly and that justice is in fact being done." Id.
321 See KANE, supra note 2, at xvii. "In the drive to get the story that will
attract listeners, readers, or viewers the interests of the accused are given little or no
consideration." Id.
322 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 333.
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current court decisions.323 Trial judges have an obligation to secure a
trial free of adverse publicity for the defendant. 24  Individuals often
do not realize that they have pre-formed, biased opinions. Therefore,
unless an attorney is able to adequately question potential jurors, their
impartial views may not be apparent. 325 Anything less than searching
questions strips the defendant of the right to an impartial jury.326
Content questioning techniques enable an attorney to eliminate
individuals that are unable to be fair and impartial. 27  Jurors are
expected to listen to the facts and then determine the guilt of the
defendant based on their analysis of those facts. A defendant seems to
be on trial when facts are published which may not be presented
during trial.328 Therefore, when a juror steps into a jury box with a
pre-formed opinion, the defendant may already be guilty and
convicted as charged.
Although the First Amendment guarantees freedom of the
press, this right is not absolute. 329 As much as the press deserves the
right to publish freely, when a criminal defendant's life is at stake
many measures and precautions need to be taken in order to ensure
that a fair trial is achieved. News stories are printed not only to
inform, but to excite and entertain the public. 330
Attorneys, as well as others involved in the trial, should have a
good rapport with the press and openly communicate. 331 However,
323 See Manson, 61 Cal. App.3d at 102 and accompanying text.
324 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358. "Bearing in mind the massive pretrial
publicity, the judge shduld have adopted stricter rules governing the use if the courtroom
by newsmen .... " Id.325MU Mmin, 500 U.S. at 442.
326 Id. at 441. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, indicates that the defendant
bears the burden of establishing whether a juror can be impartial, therefore, it is
imperative that the defendant be entitled to meaningfully examine the jurors during voir
dire. Id.
327 Id. at 442.
328 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 333 and accompanying text
329 See Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 539 and accompanying text.
330 See KANE, supra note 2, at xvii (stating that juicy and detailed crime
stories serve everyone's interest except the defendant's).
331 Stephen Seplow, Fair Trial vs. The News Could Media Help Simpson?
Debate Rages on Influence of Publicity, THE REcoRD, Oct. 5, 1994 at A17. Robert
Shapiro, one of O.J Simpson's defense attorneys, stated in his article Using the Media to
N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS.
their statements should be limited to the facts of the case. No person
involved with the trial should be able to make a statement that might
sway public opinion. These statements of opinion may have an
adverse effect on the impartiality of jurors and must be curbed. After
all, an individual's liberty may be at stake.
Leslie Renee Berger
Your Advantage, that he believes that the media can be used to have a beneficial effect on
the outcome of a highly publicized case. Id.
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